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CASENOTE
UNITED STATES V. MILLER:
WITHOUT A RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY,
WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHERS?
INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that the people are to be "secure" from "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.1 It delineates a sphere of personal securi2
ty, a right to privacy, surrounding the life of every citizen. If
the government intrudes upon this privacy without proper authorization, exemplified by a warrant or the presence of certain
specified circumstances,3 no information obtained by the effort
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. Just what is contained within this sphere, is the subject of the
principal case. If the government seeks to enter in search of evidence
of crime to be used against an individual, it must have prior authorization or be faced with certain exigent circumstances making the search
reasonable. If what is sought is not protected by the fourth amendment
and the manner of the search is not excessive, then the ban simply does
not come into play and the government may search as it pleases. See
note 3 infra.
The traditional test for a right to privacy was stated in terms of
property concepts:
Thus the areas which came to be considered protected under the
fourth amendment were generally enclosed places such as buildings,
rooms, cars, desks, and envelopes; for the most part these areas were
privately owned, and all were thought of as being under close personal dominion. Even though this approach no longer enjoys its
former stature, the viewing of certain areas as enclosed sanctuaries
of private control was not illogical and, up to a point, was useful
in reaching a supportable result.
Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 971 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Post-Katz]. This approach to privacy was symbolized
by the phrase "constitutionally protected area" first used in Lanza v.

New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), where a prison visiting room was held

not to be such an area.
In more recent years this test has been abandoned as the sole indicator of a right to privacy. Now, if the government search "violated
the privacy on which [the defendant] had justifiabily relied," and the
government lacked proper authorization, then the search was illegal.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, described the new test as "expectations of privacy."
Id. at 360-62.
3. As the fourth amendment reads, only unreasonable searches are
prohibited. But the Supreme Court has specified that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
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may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings against the
4
person so offended.
Despite the prohibition of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States held in United States v. Miller
that no right of privacy is violated by a government search of
checking account records in a bank. The evidence obtained can
be used in criminal proceedings against the depositor. The
effect and rationale of this holding seem contrary to the spirit and
history of the fourth amendment.
The Substance of Fourth Amendment Privacy
In recent years the Supreme Court of the United States has
enunciated and expanded a right to privacy either as a composite
of the "penumbral" necessities of several amendments or in
specific relation to one. 6 Most scholars, however, seem to agree
that privacy has always been the special province of the fourth
amendment. 7 It alone directly limits the government's power to
ject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Except in certain
particular situations, the searcher is not to be the judge of the propriety
of his own actions. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(complete search of a person following a full custody arrest); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (reasonable search of arrestee, and
the area within his immediate control, for weapons and evidence incident
to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police
entry into a house while in "hot pursuit" of a suspect).
4. This result is obtained by operation of the "exclusionary rule."
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (where it was extended to the state
courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (where it was first
established for federal courts).
5. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
6. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the
privacy of marriage against intrusive legislation by reference to the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (a right to privacy found in the first amendment to protect freedom of speech and association).
7. It has been called the "core of constitutional privacy." Clark,
Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L.
REV. 833, 856 (1974).
The most crucial provision of the Constitution protecting privacy, and the one most persistently identified with the concept, is the
fourth amendment. This fundamental ban upon 'unreasonable'
searches and seizures is based upon the premise that to breach the
privacy of the individual is an extraordinary action; one that requires a number of safeguards to be satisified before it can be undertaken.
Id.
Furthermore, the fourth amendment's protection differs materially
from that of other amendments.
Although the first amendment protects freedom of expression and
associational privacy, it does not limit the means by which the
government can gather evidence for criminal prosecutions. . . .The
protections of privacy offered by the first and fourth amendments
are very different; they are not simply separate aspects of a single
right transcending the individual amendments.
Post-Katz, supra note 2, at 981.
It is when the government seeks to obtain evidence to support crimi-
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collect evidence for use against a citizen in a criminal proceeding-the oldest and most successful tool of tyranny.8
The drafters of the fourth amendment felt the indignity and
recognized the danger of indiscriminate government searches?
They did not seek to protect criminals, but rather to prevent
would-be tyrants from being able to wrest from a man private
information with which to prove him guilty of nebulous crimes.
Their aim was to give recognition to that peculiar personal situation which exists only in free nations-a person's privacy. The
autonomy of the individual, the goal of a democratic society, was
to be protected by preventing unfettered government intrusion
into the intimate sphere of one's personal affairs in search of
incriminating information.' 0
nal charges against a person that privacy is invaded in the most telling
sense. The threat of conviction and its aftereffects are the most immediate and obvious pressures which a government can bring to bear
on an individual, and it is here that the fourth amendment specifically
intervenes to prevent abuses of that great power to offend one's sense
of personal security. Professor Kent Greenawalt, in his essay on privacy,
said that:
[G]iving the state unlimited power to obtain information would
be destructive of many of the values of a liberal society. Intimate
human relationships depend largely on the sense that participants
are free from the observations of others, and that sense is essential
to the development of individual points of view and modes of life.
Continuing contacts with those looking for damaging information are
both highly unpleasant and deeply disturbing to any sense of security. Moreover, the more wide-sweeping the power to gather evidence, the greater the danger that the power will be arbitrarily used
to harass those 'out of favor' or those against whom particular officials have personal grievances; the greater also the danger that
information obtained will fall into inappropriate hands or be misused.
The most important limits on the government's power to search
are set by the Fourth Amendment . . . whose meaning is filled out

by judicial decisions ....
K. Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 300
(N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
8. In England and Colonial America, government agents broke down
doors, seized goods, and rifled papers almost with impunity. The

practice was a useful technique in stemming rampant smuggling, but it
was more useful still in proving "sedition"-the crime of disagreeing
with one's government. The king's messenger, armed with "Writ of
Assistance" and "General Warrant" became a symbol of infamy helping
to spark the revolution. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 19-47 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKIJ.

9. The Fourth Amendment was not a construct based on abstract

considerations of political theory, but was drafted by the framers for
the express purpose of providing enforceable safeguards against a
recurrence of highhanded search measures which Americans, as well
as the people of England, had recently experienced.
Id. at 20.
10. A proper interpretation of the fourth amendment requires one to
focus more on what it protects than on the abuses it seeks to prevent.
The "positive right" which it seeks to preserve must be recognized. See
Post-Katz, supra note 2, at 986-87. Privacy must be seen as a situation
or milieu guarding information about ourselves, which information
we may have shared or set down, but the further publication of which
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Background to United States v. Miller
It became the responsibility of the Supreme Court to maintain the vitality of the fourth amendment by applying the
amendment's meaning to circumstances which its framers might
or could not have anticipated. 1
In the late 1960's the developwe may reasonably seek to prevent. It is a situation into which the
government should not be allowed to freely interpose itself by trying
to intercept or collect that information as evidence.
Preserving a person's control over information about himself was the
theme of the early attacks on abusive government searches. A search,
after all, "is the gathering of nonpublic information." Post-Katz, supra
note 2, at 974.
In outlawing the use of general warrants Entick v. Carrington was
concerned with more than physical intrusion: another aspect of privacy-the individual's loss of control of information-was at stake.
Lord Camden's famous opinion expressed abhorrence that the individual's 'house is rifled, his most valuable secrets are taken out of
his possession. . .

.'

A fear that 'the secret cabinets and bureaus of

every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and
inspection of a messenger' prompted the court's holding.
The Fourth Amendment's drafters were thus concerned with privacy in the sense of control over information.
Comment, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439, 1457
(1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Government Access]
(speaking of the influence which Lord Camden's opinion had on the
framers of the fourth amendment). Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765) was a civil suit in which an author sued agents of
the Crown who had ransacked his papers looking for seditious writings.
11. As Professor Landynski described the obligation:
[One] of the Court's main tasks in the future will be to define
the Fourth Amendment, in terms that will give it meaning, to protect
against those threats to privacy which arise not from searches in the
traditional sense but from 'figurative' searches, such as wire tapping
and electronic eavesdropping, and from whatever new contrivances
science may yet devise.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 270.

In the past ninety years, three particular cases have marked the
Court's progress in carrying out this duty. In Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court prevented the compelled production of
an incriminating paper, holding the attempt to be merely a new wrinkle
on the old practice of abusive searches. With a sense of inevitability,
the Court linked the fourth amendment to the privacies of life:
They [the sanctions of the fourth amendment] apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employe's of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property . ...

Id. at 630.
But images of broken doors and levered desks slowed the growth
of a fourth amendment definition of privacy. The government transgressed only when it crossed a certain line and took a solid thing. In
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the logical limits of this
property oriented doctrine were exceeded. The case involved an extensive conspiracy to smuggle liquor into the United States during the prohibition era. Government agents placed wiretaps on the phone lines in
the basement of the defendant's office building. The Court held that
the wiretap placed on lines outside of the defendant's offices and the
recordings of conversations used as evidence against him were not in violation of the fourth amendment. No search had occurred because no
trespass had taken place; and nothing was seized because conversations
were intangible.
Another phone call brought the fourth amendment into the twentieth
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ment of computer technology posed a novel threat to privacy
that was identified as a quickly ripening fourth amendment issue,
whose underlying question the Supreme Court finally decided in
Miller. Advances in computer science and data handling techniques had made the collection and use of masses of personal
information simple, easy and effective. 2 With the ease of
pushing a button, a myriad of intimate facts released by people
as a matter of course in a highly documented society could be
brought together to compile highly revealing dossiers and profiles. 1 3 The simplicity of it all, from the government investigator's perspective, was that no warrant appeared necessary. The
information was not possessed by the subject. He had, in fact,
divulged it by choice. What privacy could be violated by simply
conducting a record check of information in business and government files and data banks?
Congress reacted to the situation by coming down on both
sides of the question; favoring personal privacy on one side, 1 4 but
century. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), F.B.I. agents had
placed a recorder on top of a phone booth frequented by a suspected
"bookie." Again, the recorded conversations were used as evidence. Rejecting arguments on either side as to whether the booth was a "constitutionally protected area," the Supreme Court declared that the fourth
amendment protected the privacy of people, not places.

Id. at 351.

Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the government was not permitted to invade the justifiable "expectations of privacy" upon which
a person had relied. Recognizing the deficiences of the property test
when applied to twentieth century society, the Court refused to allow
technology to displace the fourth amendment and made the test of privacy three-dimensional.
12. Present capabilities in this field are staggering. By one process,
data can be recorded at the rate of 12 million bits per second resulting
in an accumulation of 645 million bits per square inch of plastic tape.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 167 (1970).
13. At the same time, as philosophers remind us in a different context, knowledge is power. The issue of privacy raised by computerization is whether the increased collection and processing of information for diverse public and private purposes, if not carefully controlled, could lead to a sweeping power of surveillance by government over individual lives and organizational activity. As we are
forced more and more each day to leave documentary fingerprints

and footprints behind us, -and as these are increasingly put into storage systems capable of computer retrieval, government may acquire
a power-through-data position that armies of government investigators could not create in past eras.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158 (1970).
14. E.g., The Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V
1975), which offers some degree of relief for the overexposed individual
on whom data has been collected, but whose position, in light of Miller,
seems dubious. See Comment, An Introduction to The Federal Privacy
Act of 1974 And Its Effect On The Freedom of Information Act, 11 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 463 (1976).
Through I.R.C. § 7609, added by The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.

L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1699 (1976)

(redesignating former I.R.C.

§ 7609 as § 7611), the Congress has recently made an effort to provide
some protection for the privacy of taxpayers. I.R.C. § 7609(a) requires
the giving of notice to those taxpayers about whom information is sought
by the IRS through administrative summonses issued to third-party recordholders. I.R.C. § 7609(b) affords the taxpayer the opportunity to stay
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giving in to the pressures of a harried society on the other.
Facing the specter of rising crime, Congress passed into law the
Bank Secrecy Act. 15 It required banks to preserve copies of
their depositors' checks because these had been shown to be
"highly useful"1' 6 investigative aids in law enforcement activities.
In 1974, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Act when it came under attack in California Bankers
Association v. Schultz. 17 However, while the Court saw no
violation of the depositors' fourth amendment rights in the
recordkeeping requirements, 8 it refused to hold on the validity
of the regulation19 allowing government access to the records.
These claims were dismissed as premature because no attempt to
20
gain access had been made by the government.
Having passed through nearly ninety years of interpretation
in linking privacy to the fourth amendment and defining the
limits of its protection, 21 the Supreme Court had yet to decide
whether privacy in this particular form was to be considered a
protected interest. When the factual situation of United States
v. Miller22 came before the Court, the question was posed. The
Court was called upon to decide whether, by a logical extension
compliance by such third party and the unconditional right to intervene
in any subsequent enforcement proceeding in the district court. Under
prior law, the taxpayer did not have a right to intervene in such proceedings by virtue of "interest" alone under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a). Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Government Access, supra note
10, at 1447-50. This provision was enacted only seven months after the
decision in Miller was handed down by the Supreme Court.
15. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1829b (1970) (retention of records by insured banks); id. § 1730d (1970)
(retention of records by savings and loan institutions insured by the
FSLIC); id. §§ 1951-1959 (1970) (retention of records by all noninsured
financial institutions); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign currency transactions). The Treasury Department regulations issued pursuant to the Act were codified in 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1973).
The banks are required to maintain copies of signature cards, ledger
cards, and the depositor's social security or taxpayer indentification
number. The check copying requirements result in virtually all of a
depositor's checks being copied despite the specified exceptions in 31
C.F.R. § 103.34 (1973). See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 25-41 (1974); Note, The Bank Secrecy Act, the Fourth Amendment, and Standing, 36 LA. L. REV. 834 (1976).
16. 12 U.S.C. & 1829b (a) (1) (1970).
17. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). As Professors Westin and Miller point out
the very existence of large pools of data may in itself be a threat not
only to privacy but many other freedoms as well. See note 12 supra.
The Supreme Court allowed the creation of yet another data reservoir
without mentioning privacy in its opinion. The proponents of what has
come to be known as "informational privacy," as defined in note 24 infra,
saw the decision in California Bankers to be a major setback to the establishment of such a right. See ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN

THE UNITED STATES, PRIVACY IN

34, 81-83 (1974).
18. 416 U.S. at 52-53.
19. 31 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1973).
20. 416 U.S. at 51-52.
21. See note 11 supra.
22. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

ETY

A FREE Soci-
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of the "expectations of privacy test, ' 23 a right to informational
privacy24 was to be recognized or that the government's access to
checking account records was to be paramount over any interest
of the depositor. The Miller Court decided that the depositor's
interest was patently inferior.
UNITED STATES V. MILLER

Facts
Mitchell Miller was tried on charges of running a still and
conspiring to defraud the United States of tax revenues. Treasury Department agents had subpoenaed copies of Miller's cancelled checks from two of his banks, which copies had been
preserved pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. 25 The copied
checks provided investigative leads and were used as evidence at
Miller's criminal trial. The district court denied his motion to
suppress the checks on fourth amendment grounds and convicted him. The court of appeals overturned the conviction and the
government petitioned the Supreme Court.
In reversing the appellate decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that a depositor had no fourth amendment interest in his checks. Rather than extending fourth
amendment protection to such documents and data under its
most advanced test for privacy, the Court denied such a right.
Decision of the Supreme Court
In rejecting Miller's contentions that he had a fourth
amendment interest in his checks, the Supreme Court established two basic ground rules: first, it would consider the original checks rather than the copies 2 6 implying that if a protected
23. See note 2 supra.
24. "[T]he control individuals exercise over the collection and use

of personal information about themselves." ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, PRIVACY IN A
FREE SOCIETY 28 (1974).
The information contained in a depositor's checks is an excellent example of the sort of data which a right to informational privacy is expected to protect.
In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational
interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.
These are all tied to one's social security number; and now that we

have the data banks, these other items will enrich that storehouse
and make it possible for a bureaucrat-by pushing one button-to
get in an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who are
subversives or potential and likely candidates.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. 425 U.S. at 442.
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fourth amendment interest existed it was more likely to appear
in the originals than in the microfilms;2 T second, the Court
refused to consider only a situation involving an allegedly defective subpoena. 28
If a fourth amendment interest existed it
would be independent of whatever sort of legal process might be
used to effect an intrusion, and only if such an interest were
29
found would the qualities of such process be at issue.
The Court applied both the classical "property" test and
the Katz expectations of privacy analysis 0° in examining the
nature of the evidence Miller sought to suppress. Failing both
of these, the checks 1 would simply be outside the sphere of a
depositor's fourth amendment protection. The government's
acquisition of the checks by whatever means would not have
been an invasion of his privacy as a depositor, leaving Miller's
objection groundless.3 2 In that case the general rule would be
applicable: that "a subpoena to a third party to obtain the
records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant,"
33
even in the midst of a criminal prosecution.
First, in applying the property test, the Court relied on its
decision in CaliforniaBankers34 to point out that banks are not
"neutrals in transactions involving negotiable instruments," and
that the checks properly become the records of the bank. 35 On
this basis the Court distinguished Boyd v. United States,30
27. For the Court to make a distinction between the original checks
and the microfilm copies implies a property analysis of the depositor's
right to privacy. While the checks may arguably be considered his
property, any copies, e.g., microfilms, would undeniably be the property
of the bank. Government Access, supra note 10, at 1451.
28. 425 U.S. at 441 n.2. The Court had effectively decided that the
question of the subpoena's validity was not an issue, in that their entire
decision was based on the sole ground of the complete absence of a
fourth amendment interest. Id. at 440. But later in their opinion the
Court implied that the subpoenas in Miller were, in fact, proper and on
that basis distinguished the case relied on by Justice Brennan in his
dissent. Id. at 445 n.7. Whatever implications the Court may have been
trying to make as to the validity of the subpoenas, by the Court's own
analysis the subject is irrelevant to the depositor. Having no interest
at all in the information sought, his position would be the same as that
of a depositor whose records were searched without any legal process.
Id. at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. If a fourth amendment interest had been discovered, the Court
would have had to determine whether the legal process was proper under
the circumstances or was a "figurative" search violating the fourth
amendment as the Court held the compelled production of a document
to be in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. See note 2 supra.
31. Deposit slips were also involved in Miller, but whatever determination may be made as to checks probably applies to deposit slips
as well. Government Access, supra note 10, at 1450.
32. See note 28 supra.
33. 425 U.S. at 444.
34. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
35. 425 U.S. at 440 (quoting California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 48-49 (1974)).
36. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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which had been the mainstay of Miller's argument. The Miller
Court said that the depositor could assert neither possession nor
ownership of the documents in question, thereby precluding any
right to privacy based on property interests.
Secondly, a depositor's expectations of privacy were negated by the fact that the checks were, in essence, published when
placed into the banking cycle. Any information contained in
the checks was "voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed
to their employees in the ordinary course of business, 3'1 and the
depositor thereby took the "risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that
person to the government."3" The Court concluded that the test
of Katz offered no comfort to Miller because "[w] hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection, '"" and such information could be obtained by the government without infringing upon any privacy
right.
Having arrived at this point, the question of the propriety
of the process used to gain access to the checks was neither
logically nor legally an issue. Miller had "no Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by a challenge to the
subpoenas. '40 The Court refused to give an inch in allowing a
depositor a protectible interest despite the facts that Miller apparently had not surrendered his privacy in terms of its prior
decisions and that there was precedent to show that depositors
The Supreme
did have a property interest in their checks. 4
Court held, in effect, that one who engages in such an ordinary
transfer of information thereby deprives himself of any privacy
interest which could restrict the government's ability to search
among that data for incriminating evidence.
37. 425 U.S. at 442.
38. Id. at 443. In support of this proposition, the Miller Court cited
its decision in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971). In
White, government agents had eavesdropped on conversations between

the defendant and an informant who was carrying a miniature radio

transmitter. The Court affirmed the conviction on the ground that White
had taken the risk of the informant being a government agent when he

conveyed to him information implicating himself in drug dealings. The
Miller Court's characterization of its holding in White is neither strictly
accurate nor applicable to the situation in Miller. See notes 55-63 and
accompanying text infra.
39. 425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351

(1967)).
40. 425 U.S. at 445.
41. The Court relied on its decision in United States v. White, 401

U.S. 745 (1971), to show that a depositor voluntarily gives up his expec-

tations of privacy when he transfers information to his bank via his

checks. But the rationale of White apparently assumes the valid privacy
of some transfers of information while excluding as unjustifiable the expectations of a defendant within the specific fact pattern of White. See

note 38 supra.
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The Depositor's Property Interest
With only one paragraph, the Court in Miller dismissed the
depositor's argument that the checks taken by the government
were his property and therefore private papers suitable for
fourth amendment protection. 42 The question is far more complex and confused than the Court seemed to indicate. A brief
43
survey of relevant case law shows a far less certain conclusion.
42. 425 U.S. at 442.
43. The question of who has title to paid and cancelled checks, such
as those taken in Miller, has not been litigated per se in the past half
century (the same is true as to deposit slips), probably because title to
such documents is of almost no commercial importance. Government
Access, supra note 10, at 1450 n.47. What cases there have been on the
matter show, however, that at common law any title there may have
been was in the depositor.
In 1824, Lord Abbott said of them: "Checks are generally returned
to the customer; but if not, while in the hands of the bank, they must
be considered in the possession of the customer; the bank is his agent."
Partridge v. Coates, 171 Eng. Rep. 976, 977 (K.B. 1824). The bank had
little more than naked possession while the ownership of the depositor
gave him "constructive possession" even though the items were held by
the bank. Three years later, in urging on a litigant who was reluctant
to produce a check at trial and who claimed as excuse that his banker
had it, another English court said: "The bankers are your agents. You
would have -a right to go to the bankers and demand the check of them."
Burton v. Payne, 172 Eng. Rep. 236 (K.B. 1827). Note that in these early
cases the relationship between depositor and bank, at least in this facet,
was one of principal to agent. In a criminal trial in 1850, the court stated
definitively: "It is always considered that the check is the property of
the drawer when paid." Queen v. Watts, 169 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (C.A.
1850). An American court in 1916 had no more doubt on the point than
the Royal judiciary. Van Dyke v. Ogden Say. Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161
P. 50 (1916).
In later American cases the common law position has generally gone
unnoticed. But cf. Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir.
1971) which noted Van Dyke as some slight authority but preferred to
rely upon the custom of dealing between customer and bank in reaching
the same conclusion. Also, the American decisions have generally commingled property issues relating to actual bank records of transactions
in which the bank was an active party (e.g., loan applications, loan
repayment tickets, promissory notes, etc.) with those in reference to
documents of primary concern to the depositor (e.g., checks, account
statements, and so on). In the latter, the bank accomplishes little more
than an accounting function, but the difference has been ignored. See
Government Access, supra note 10, at 1439-40.
In Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969), the court
said that a depositor had no standing to challenge a subpoena directed
at a bank for the production of his checks. United States v. Gross, 416
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) came to a similar conclusion. Gross is cited
by an authority on search and seizure to support the proposition that
a depositor has no property interest in any records kept by a bank on
his account on which to base a challenge to a subpoena as an indirect
search in violation of his fourth amendment rights. 1 J. VARON,
SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNTIES

660 (2d ed. 1974).

Gross, however, supports a much narrower holding. In that case the
bank itself was a victim of the customer's fraud. Gross had been running
a "check kiting" operation, using the bank as his foil. As Gross' agent,
therefore, the bank was no longer under any duty not to disclose the information in his checking account records to another, in this case the
government. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395, comment f
(1957).

By the precedent which it cites Gross introduces another factor
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In support of its contention that checks are bank records
and not the depositor's papers, the Miller Court referred to its
decision in California Bankers.44 There it had said that "the
' '4
body of law which has grown up in this area" is "voluminous. 1
Upon examination it appears that this may be its primary virtue.
Actually the American precedents are confused, and when considered with the common law cases, the weight of prior decisions
can be seen as favoring the depositor.
Even if the Court had seen the depositor in Miller as
having a property interest in his checks, it would not have been
of benefit when considering the copies made by the banks.
46
Without serious doubt these are the property of the banks.
Furthermore, with the advent of electronic funds transfer systems, checks will become obsolete. 47 When deposits and withdrawals are relayed at the speed of light, and records are kept in
the memory banks of time-shared computers, where and in what
would the property interest be?
which often confuses the issue of bank record privacy. Dosek v. United

States, 405 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969) and
Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968) both involved

corporate bank records. Corporate records do not have the same fourth

amendment protection as is afforded an individual's private papers and
1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 155, at 331-32 (12th ed. 1974).
Galbraith sought support
from In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965) which dealt with a bank's
own records in the strict sense.
In disposing of the defendant's surest prop for his claims of fourth
amendment privacy, Gross highlights an anomaly in the chain of American decisions on bank record interests. Gross relied on the decision of
Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). Such reliance was
misplaced because the third circuit reversed itself three years later when
the Zimmermann case came up once more on appeal. Zimmermann
v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939). This reversal was prompted by
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.
1937). Zimmermann involved a claim of fourth amendment privacy as
to the records held by the defendant's banker who was also his broker
in securities. The McMann decision was concerned only with a government subpoena for brokerage records. Explicitly relying on McMann, the
Zimmermann court reversed its earlier decision. Following a narrow
construction of McMann, however, the Zimmermann holding was reversed only so far as the brokerage records were concerned, leaving
Judge Buffington's 1936 statement in the first Zimmermann case of
personal privacy as to bank records intact:
To say that their bank accounts, withdrawals, their loans and collateral deposits, are the property of their bankers and brokers, and
the taxpayers have no right or standing to prevent an unreasonable
search thereof, is to lose sight of substance and rest on shadow ...
[W]e regard the search here asserted as a violation of the
natural law of privacy in one's own affairs which exists in liberty
loving peoples and nations-for no right is more vital to 'liberty and
the pursuit of happiness' than the protection of the citizen's private
affairs, their right to be let alone.
Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1936). Judge
Buffington dissented in the 1939 reversal.
44. 425 U.S. at 442.
45. 416 U.S. at 48.
are more easily subject to subpoena.

46. See note 27 supra.

47. See Government Access, supra note 10, at 1441-42.
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The Miller Court gave no edge to the depositor by focusing
its property analysis on the original checks. Property distinctions were swiftly becoming an outmoded test of privacy in
general and especially so when speaking of informational privacy. When the depositor transferred private information in his
checks to a bank, he could no longer be said to own that
information except by a strained interpretation of property concepts. But such an analysis should have been unnecessary in
any case. He did expect that the privacy of that information
would be maintained, and, in light of Katz v. United States,48
unless those expectations were shown to be unjustified, the
fourth amendment should have protected them.
Expected Privacy Denied

An individual seeking to maintain the privacy of personal
information disclosed to business and other institutions must rely
on the expanded right of privacy established by the Supreme
Court in Katz. 49 What the Miller Court failed to emphasize was
that when considering information which has been turned over
to another and which may be transmuted into an intangible
form, property concepts of privacy cease to be meaningful. All
that remains is the individual's expectation that the privacy of
that information will be protected.
The Katz Definition of Privacy

The Court in Katz recognized that privacy is not secrecy.
No one could function in modern society if the only form of
48. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49. Only the Katz test protects one's sense of privacy when no property right is available with which to invoke the fourth amendment.
Katz could have been a classic "constitutionally protected area" decision
-the phone booth would have been a perfect foil for that analysis. See
note 11 supra. But the Court obviously intended to extend the fourth
amendment definition of privacy. As Professor Miller characterized it:
"[T]he Supreme Court seems to have recognized the special threat of
technology and has enunciated expansive general principles to protect
a person's legitimate expectations concerning his privacy." A. MILLER,
THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 319 n.121 (1972).
Katz "indicates that the Court [was] prepared to release the
Fourth Amendment, as it had the Fifth Amendment [in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], from the moorings of precedent and determine its scope by the logic of its central concepts." Kitch, Katz v.
United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV.
133. As the Court said: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people
not places." 389 U.S. at 351. The privacy of persons could no longer

depend on property relationships in a society where property itself

was represented more by intangibles than real entities. Privacy is
a condition which one seeks to establish and which may be protected
even when devoid of a property right. One may be forced to go into
the public eye, but certain vestiges of confidentiality and personal integrity are retained-this is the privacy protected in Katz.
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privacy respected was seclusion. What a person does keep
entirely to himself is necessarily protected from exposure, but
should he decide to confide his trust in a societal function or
process recognized to be private in nature, the government should
not be allowed to freely interfere. The core of the Katz opinion
was expressed by the Supreme Court in these words: "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."5 0
What Katz established, and what the Miller Court declined
to recognize, was that there are two criteria to be met in order to
determine that what a person claimed was private is to be treated
so and accorded fourth amendment protection. First, a person
must have "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." 51 The individual must
have actually relied on privacy he felt he had obtained and
the expectation must have been one "buttressed by social norms;
the intended walls of privacy must have some objective validity." 2 Absent either of these factors, government seeking of
information does not amount to an unreasonable search and the
fourth amendment is not implicated.
The Court in Miller begged the first question of the Katz
analysis by saying that a depositor published his checks when his
50. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (1967). To state the meaning of Katz both
sentences are necessary. The first sentence refers to the first part of the
two-tiered test of Katz. See note 51 and accompanying text infra. In
Miller, the Court prefaced its denial of an expectation of privacy by

quoting only the first sentence. See note 39 supra. In at least five other
places both sentences are properly quoted. California Bankers Ass'n v.
(Douglas, J., dissenting); 1 C. TORCIA,
§ 150 at 320 (12th ed. 1974); Clark,
Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L.
REV. 833, 864 (1974); Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limts of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, 138; Comment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis,
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 88-89 (1974)
WHARTON'S

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

69 Nw. U.L.

REV.

626, 631 (1974).

One commentator quotes only the

second sentence which, in any case, is still a valid representation of Katz.
Post-Katz, supra note 2, at 976-77.
By this stunted reference the Court devalues the application of Katz

to the present situation and provides an apparently logical link for its
later use of United States v. White and builds an analytical framework
which is consistent with neither case. See notes 54-55 and accompanying
text infra. Such a practice by the present Court has been noted before.

See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198, 1212-14 (1971).

51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)

curring).

(Harlan, J., con-

Justice Harlan's expression has been seen as a proper descrip-

tion of the mechanics of the Katz definition of privacy interests.
Post-Katz, supra note 2, at 982.
52. Post-Katz, supra note 2, at 984.

See
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bank received them. The simple transfer of information might
have increased the risk of disclosure, but it did not preclude the
application of Katz to prevent government seizure of the data.
The Court failed to ask the question of whether the relationship
between the depositor and his bank was one in which a real
respect for privacy was anticipated by the depositor.
Information Control and United States v. White
In analyzing a depositor's expectations of privacy for the
information in the checks he writes, the focus of inquiry must
shift from the documents themselves to the data that they transmit. The checks are only the means used to convey that which
is the real object of privacy. Soon, even checks will drop out of
the picture as new modes of financial transaction become feasible.
Recognizing this logical requirement the Court in Miller
made its final denial of a depositor's fourth amendment interest
by using its precedent on information control-United States v.
White. 53 A depositor had no valid expectation of privacy, the
Court said, because he had revealed the information in his
checks to the bank and, in so doing, had taken the risk that the
bank would convey it to the government.5 4 In this xespect he
had failed to meet the first requirement of the Katz test; he had
no actual expectation of privacy on which to rely. The rule in
White, however, refers only to the second of those requirements
and should only be applied when the information conveyed is of
a certain nature and its recipient is of a specified characterneither of which can be found in the normal relationship between a depositor and his bank.5"
53. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).

One commentator described White as the

Court's "most progressive analysis of Fourth Amendment interests."

Government Access, supra note 10, at 1461.

There the case was seen as

soundly supporting the justifiable nature of a depositor's expectations of
privacy in terms of information control. Id. at 1461-63.
54. 425 U.S. at 443.
55. Whenever one transfers information to another he takes the risk
that such other person may give it to yet another. But the White decision obviously assumed that certain transfers of information could be
shielded from unsupervised government intrusions because of the valid
expectations that nonparties had been excluded. Therefore, the fact of
the transaction alone is insufficient to permit government monitoring
without a warrant. On its facts, White specified that a transfer of information involving:
1) data clearly implicating the speaker in crime and,
2) a listener of objectively doubtful trustworthiness,
was not a transaction protected by the fourth amendment even though
the speaker actually expected that his communications were private.
In a normal check writing situation, as in Miller, the quality of information in the checks falls below that which could notify the bank of
criminal activity. Furthermore, banks are not generally considered to
be of such a character that one should reasonably anticipate that they
are acting as government spies. See notes 60 and 62 infra.
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In White, government agents testified to incriminating conversations between the defendant and a government informant
which they had overheard by means of a radio transmitter
concealed on the person of the informant. The court of appeals
reversed after applying the Katz test of privacy. In affirming
the conviction and reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court specified that Katz was not retroactive and, therefore,
could not be applied in deciding White.56 Instead, White was
seen as the latest in a series of informer-secret agent cases
involving statements made by defendants to informants working
for the government or undercover law enforcement officers."7
The rulings in these cases were held to have been undisturbed by
the decision in Katz. While not relying on Katz, the Court chose
to use its language in defining the issue under consideration as
whether the actual expectations of privacy of the defendant were
objectively justifiable, given the particular circumstances.5 8 The
Court was probably trying to harmonize the informer situation
cases with Katz.
Unlike Miller, the defendant in each informer case had
voluntarily and definitively expressed the fact of his involvement
in criminal activity to another. That other person in each case
was one whose character or status made him an extremely poor
objective risk for entrusting such information. The recurrence
56. 401 U.S. at 754.

57. A major impetus for the development of a new test of privacy

had been the difficulty the Court had with three informer cases in the
term prior to Katz, in 1966. In these cases government agents (either
officers or informants) had eavesdropped on, or overheard, the defendant's conversations. One agent had carried a tape recorder. See
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385

U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).

The Court

seemed anxious to show in each case that no violation of the fourth
amendment had taken place in terms of the property test. In Osborn
the Court noted that prior judicial authorization (but not actually a warrant) had been obtained for the recorder concealed on the agent. The
Court appeared to be struggling for a rationale to replace the property
test without depriving law enforcement authorities of the highly useful
investigative tools of informers and secret agents which had been planted
by the government in the criminal's camp. The decision in Katz seemed
to place this technique under a cloud until White was handed down. Despite their use of much Katz language, the Court effectively carved out
an enclave for the pre-Katz informer-secret agent situation which could
not be jeopardized by the new test for privacy. See generally Kitch,
Katz v. United States: The Limits of The Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup.
CT. REv. 133; Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275
(1974); Post-Katz, supra note 2.

58. Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular

defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which
they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their companions ....

Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in

Katz, is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justi-

fiable"-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in
the absence of a warrant.

401 U.S. at 751-52.
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of this combination in White was more than sufficient for the
Court to determine that the defendant's actual expectations of
privacy were not justifiable, either in the estimation of society or
in the light of reason. The decision in White was not that one
must expect that if he gives personal information to another it
will very probably end up in the hands of the government; rather
it was that a wrongdoer's actual expectation of privacy in relating his wrongful conduct to another, of similar character or otherwise doubtful trustworthiness, is not an expectation which society will recognize as reasonably private. Therefore, protection
59
under the fourth amendment will not extend to it.
This rule should not apply to the relationship of a depositor
to his bank as found in Miller. The depositor disclosed no
picture of criminal conduct to the bank.60
The bank itself,
besides being totally ignorant of any wrongdoing on Miller's
part, was a pillar of trustworthiness and confidentiality. It did
not go to the police, but rather had the information in Miller's
accounts taken from it. 61 Seen in this light, the White decision
should not have precluded the depositor's expectation of privacy,
but rather should have stood him in good stead in asserting the
justifiable character of the expectations he had.
By improperly invoking its decision in White, the Supreme
Court denied Miller a fair evaluation of his expectations of
privacy. That he had such expectations there is no doubt; both
banks and customers traditionally acknowledge the confidentiality of checking account records. 2 The only question left was
whether his expectations were justifiable. His expectations of
59. All of the informer cases seem to etch out the simple, objective
moral that partners in crime cannot rely on each other. An earlier case,
within the same line of decisions, points out an even more obvious truth
-that one contemplating a crime is better off not informing a known
federal agent of the fact. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)
(where the defendant attempted to bribe an agent of the IRS).
60. Checks, excepting the case of an overdraft, normally do not convey the information necessary to make a bank cognizant of criminal
activity as in the informer situations. In Miller the government had to
go to the bank. search the files, and formulate the necessary composite
of information by sifting through a good number of checks.
61. A similar situation may arise where one relates incriminating information to another whose status or character makes him an excellent
depositary but who betrays his apparent or avowed trustworthiness and
goes to the police with the information for reasons of his own. Here
the trusted party, and not the government, violates an expectation of privacy in which case the fourth amendment would not apply. This fact
pattern is apparent in neither White nor Miller.
62. "Commerical banks have rigorously maintained the confidentiality of checking account transactions. Generally information is released
to private parties only upon consent of the depositor and is confined to
credit information." Government Access, supra note 10, at 1463 (footnotes omitted). The same commentator notes later that this recognition
of confidentiality is supported by more than custom. Banks have been
successfully sued for wrongful disclosure of account information. Id. at
1464.
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privacy, however, never received the benefit of the Katz analysis.
Had it been used, his fourth amendment interest should have
been apparent.
As a depositor, Miller had the actual expectation that his
account records would remain confidential. His expectations
were justifiable in that, by engaging in the normal activity of
maintaining a checking account he did not communicate a
picture of criminal conduct to an objectively untrustworthy depositary. His expectations were those of an ordinary citizen
who writes checks and trusts his bank to keep them confidential.
Despite this, the Miller Court denied that a depositor had any
protectible privacy interest in his checks which would prevent
the government from obtaining them from his bank simply on
demand.'
The implications of this decision pose the final riddle of
United States v. Miller. Considering the purpose behind the
Bank Secrecy Act 64 and the jeopardy to informational privacy
that the collection of such data alone represented, was it either
logical or necessary for the Court to go so far as to allow
searches in such a sensitive field without any meaningful limitation by the traditional safeguard of prior judicial scrutiny?
63. The Supreme Court of California has provided an excellent example of the application of the Katz test in a case which is conceptually
very close to the situation found in Miller. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.
3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd on rehearing, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d
457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). Acting on a
tip that the defendant was engaged in illicit drug and sex activities, the
police in Krivda conducted a surveillance of her residence. They observed trash barrels in front of the house. Noticing an approaching garbage truck, they flagged it down and persuaded the driver to dump the
well of his truck and then pick up Krivda's trash. After this the police
examined the trash, opened several paper sacks and discovered evidence
which they later used at Krivda's trial for violation of California drug
laws. The California Supreme Court held the search without a warrant

-to be illegal. Relying on the decision in Katz, the court in Krivda found
that the police had violated the defendant's expectations of privacy even
though the trash appeared to be abandoned property and the police

themselves had not retrieved it. People justifiably expect that government agents will not rummage through their carefully packaged trash,
even though they may run the risk of private persons doing the same.
By analogy, Miller should have been afforded the same protection
in his checking account records. People expect such records to be confidential. In Miller, as in Krivda, the entity through which the government obtained the data was, in relation to the data, no more than a
simple conduit for the material in which the information was embodied.
Neither had gone to the police, but rather both holders had been approached by law enforcement agents. United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971), would have been as ill-suited to negate Krivda's expectations
of privacy as it was to deny Miller's. In neither situation was there an
informant who had anything on which to inform. On these facts, the
test of privacy in Katz which prevented Krivda's conviction should have
shown that Miller had a protectible fourth amendment interest as well.
64. See note 15 supra.
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THE IMPACT OF MILLER
The full impact of Miller can be realized by an examination
of the method and control of access to records kept under the
Bank Secrecy Act. 5 Government access was not at issue in
California Bankers,16 because no case or controversy was
presented as to a government attempt at acquisition. 7
The
access control again failed to receive a close scrutiny in Miller,
because the depositor was not seen to have the requisite fourth
amendment interest to raise an objection to the subpoenas
used.68 The Supreme Court did point out that the access control of "existing legal process," meant just that and no more and
that a subpoena duces tecum under the Bank Secrecy Act was
not to be subjected to any special test of its validity.69
The
Miller Court's lengthy discussion on the general validity of such
legal process is especially interesting in that, as to the case in
point, the question of validity of process was never reached. 70
No controversy as to the propriety of the subpoenas could arise
unless initiated by one who had standing. The depositor, the
person most intimately concerned with raising that issue, was
seen as disqualified from doing so.
In one area Congress has already moved to correct this
anomaly to some degree. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 gives the
taxpayer, who has been identified in the description of records
requested by an IRS summons directed to a third-party record
holder, the right to be notified of the summons, to stay the thirdparty's compliance with the summons, and to intervene to prevent enforcement of the summons. 7 ' While these provisions provide essential protections to the depositor, their scope is effectively limited by decisions such as Miller, because a taxpayerintervenor will be precluded from asserting important constitutional defenses against the summons. 72 This is especially inter65. 31 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1973) provides for the method and control of
access to the records. The Court in California Bankers construed this
Treasury Regulation -to be an expression of the congressional intent that
access to the information should be available under "existing legal process." 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
66. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
67. "Claims of the depositors against the compulsion by lawful process of bank records involving the depositors' own transactions must
wait until such process issues." Id. at 51-52.
68. 425 U.S. at 445.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 440 (where the Court declares that the sole ground for its
reversal of the court of appeals was the lack of a fourth amendment
interest in the checks on the part of the depositor).
71. See note 14 supra.
72. In light of the Court's holding in Miller and its recent decision
in Fisher v. United States, 25 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that no fifth
amendment privilege attached to tax related papers transferred by a taxpayer's accountant to his client's attorney), it is obvious that in the nor-
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esting in light of the fact that the avowed purpose of the new
provisions is to provide further "safeguards which might be desirable in terms of protecting the right of privacy. '7 3 The paradox of the Supreme Court being unable to detect a fourth amendment privacy interest, where Congress enacts further safeguards
to protect what is seen to be an already existing right of privacy,
should not be ignored.
Except in the case of an IRS summons, apparently only the
bank itself, the recordholder, could raise a challenge to such
process and then only with a small hope of success. Objections
to compelled production of records are normally limited to the
relevance of the material and the breadth of the request. 4 The
lack of "relevance" would be difficult to show given the normal
situation in which a bank is unable to identify the individual
depositor as a person and will almost inevitably rely upon the
government's statement of purposes and objectives for the inspection of records. 75 "Overbreadth" could logically be based
only on the burden placed on the banks themselves in retrieving
the required information. Any interests of the depositor on
either score would be irrelevant because he has no protectible
rights in the case of such a government inquiry.
The practice which will arise in the future is simple acquiescence to governmental demands. In that case, the necessity of a subpoena could be reasonably seen as an unnecessary
mal situation neither.fourth nor fifth amendment claims will be available
to a taxpayer intervening under the Tax Reform Act provisions. Note,
IRS Access to Bank Records; Proposed Modifications in Administrative
Subpoena Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 272-75 (1976). Evidently all
that is left for the intervening taxpayer to assert in opposition to a sum-

mons would be "sole criminal purpose" behind the summons, relevance,
and overbreadth of the request. Id. As the legislative history indicates:

[T]hese provisions are not intended to expand the substantive rights
of [the] parties. Also, of course, the noticee will not be permitted to
assert as defenses to enforcement issues which only affect the interests of a third-party record keeper, such as the defense that the
third-party record keeper was not properly served with the summons (i.e. wrong address) or that it will be unduly burdensome for

the third-party record keeper to comply with the summons.

S.

REP.

No. 94-938 (Part I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 370-71 (1976).

The

House Report uses almost identical language. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1976).

Another notable omission in the present legislation is that it fails
to provide the taxpayer with the right to be present when the records
are transferred by the record holder to the IRS. In this regard the taxpayer must still rely on the good offices of the third party to prevent
transfer of any more than is required by the summons.
73. S. REP. No. 94-938 (Part I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1976); H.R.
REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1976).

74. Id. at 445 (citing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327

U.S. 186, 208 (1946)).

See Comment, Privacy, Papersand the Fourth and

Fifth Amendments: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 626, 632
(1974).

75. Many bankers are unaware that there may be opportunity to re-

sist such legal process. See Government Access, supra note 10, at 1470.
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formality, easily dispensed with by corporate bodies interested in
amicable relations with highly powerful government investigative agencies. The case which the Court distinguished, Burrows
v. Superior Court76 will then be the general rule rather than an
"unattractive" exception. 7 With the interests of the depositor
entirely removed from the picture, the phrase "existing legal
process" becomes no more than mere words. Banks were precluded from asserting their customers' fourth amendment interThe customer was denied any
ests in California Bankers. 7
protectible interest in Miller.7 9 Whatever information is now
passed between bank and government is almost entirely an affair
of those two institutions.
The asserted purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act was to aid
law enforcement activities in the increasingly difficult fight
against crime.80 With this purpose in mind the creation of yet
another massive conglomeration of data was acceptable, even if
not patently desirable. But, as even the Supreme Court recognized, Congress meant for access to this information to be
controlled" '-if not for the benefit of the depositor, then for
In
76. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
Burrows a police search of bank account records made without a warrant
at the consent of bank officials upon an oral request of the police was
held to be an illegal search in violation of the depositor's rights under
the fourth amendment. Justice Brennan relied upon Burrows in 'his
dissent and quoted it at length. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
448-53 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Neither Miller nor the depositor in Burrows were given notice
of the government search. The Court in Miller notes that for the respondent this would have no legal consequences however "unattractive"
it might be. 425 U.S. at 443 n.5. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, characterized this aspect of the case as "not just unattractive," but rather
as a "fatal constitutional defect." Id. at 448 n.2.
78. "Whatever wrong [the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act] might work on a depositor, it works no injury on his
bank." 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974).
79. Justice Marshall said in his dissent to California Bankers that
"the majority engages in a hollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment
claims are to be labeled premature until such time as they can be deemed
too late." 416 U.S. at 97. In his dissent to Miller he reiterated that
I wash my hands of today's
"there is nothing new in today's holding ....
extended redundancy." 425 U.S. at 456.
80. This justification for broad search powers has been used before.
Professor Landynski summarized Lord Camden's reaction to it when it
was raised in Entick v. Carrington:
Lord Camden rejected the 'argument of utility' that the authorization of such warrants would be of indispensable assistance in the
apprehension of criminals. He pointed out that even in crimes such
as murder, rape, and forgery, all more serious offenses than libel,
'our law has provided no paper search in these cases to help forward
the conviction.' Why this was so he could not say, but he suggested
that it proceeded either 'from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more
pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public. .. .'
LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 55. For a discussion of Entick v. Carrington
see note 10 supra.

81. Both the legislative history and the applicable regulation make
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whom? His is the privacy in jeopardy. No other logical reason
is evident. Such a total denial of protection for the person about
whom the information will be sought can only be viewed as unnecessary and excessive. Recent legislation has indicated that
Congress is still concerned with the protection of a depositor's
privacy interest and, therefore, that United States v. Miller may
have outpaced the congressional intent behind the Bank Secrecy
Act.8 2
With little difficulty, the holding of Miller can be aptly
applied to almost any situation where one has disclosed personal
information to another person or to an institution who then
preserves it in files or records.8 3 Only the recordholder could
resist a search, and that with little chance of success. Information is kept on many more people, in other forms, by institutions
with far less forceful a custom of customer information security
than banks have. 4 Could a right of privacy be found in any of
these which was not present in checking account records? Will
the Supreme Court make a case by case review of each source
and type of information? It seems neither practicable nor likely.
CONCLUSION

The need for informational privacy would not exist without
the concomitant need for the massive transfer of personal information in a modern society. The individual must trade off the
shield of secrecy if he is to function within the framework of a
highly technical culture. Society also has its need-access to
such information in order to regulate its affairs and to combat
crime. These needs, however, must be balanced, with neither
being given too dominant a position, keeping in mind that
specific reference to the fact that access to the records was to be controlled. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
82. See note 14 supra and notes 71-73 and accompanying text sup 'a.
83. It would seem that privileged communications would be excluded
from the effect of Miller.
84. To help himself, to help science and to help society run efficiently, the individual now pours a constantly flowing stream of information about himself into the record files-birth and marriage
records, public school records, census data, military records, passport
data, government and private employment records,, public-health
records, civil defense records, loyalty-security clearance records,
income-tax returns, social-security returns, land and housing records,
insurance records, bank records, business reporting forms to govern-

ment, licensing applications, financial declarations required by law,
charitable contributions, credit applications and records, automobile

registration records, post office records, telephone records, psychological and psychiatric records, scholarship or research-grant records,
church records-and on and on. New forms of financial operations
have produced the credit card, which records the where, when and

how-much of many once-unrecorded purchasing, travel, and entertainment transactions of the individual's life.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 159 (1970).
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because of their importance and fragility individual rights must
necessarily be given the benefit of the doubt when the weighing
is done. It is both unfair and dangerous for a government to
take undue advantage of the individual's vulnerability as it has
done in United States v. Miller.
The drafters of the fourth amendment recognized the danger inherent in free and unsupervised searches. The insidious
threat of governmental abuse of such power was to be checked
by the requirement for judicial review, forcing the searcher each
time to make his purpose and objective known to an impartial
magistrate who could objectively determine the propriety of the
enterprise. The Supreme Court in Miller has drastically chosen
to dispense with this requirement in an area desparately in need
of such protection, without giving proper argument or displaying
due consideration for the results which may obtain. It may
sometime be seen that what Olmstead v. United States8 5 was to
wiretapping, Miller will be to informational privacy. In Olinstead, however, the Court could only be faulted for too rigid an
adherence to outmoded principles, whereas the Court in Miller
seemed guided more by private insight than cogent analysis.
Perhaps they felt that the needs of society must come first when
measured against an already much devalued individual right to
privacy, for as Professor Landynski has noted: "The needs of
the day have swept away much that was sacred in the American
heritage; the barriers of privacy have crumbled on many
fronts."' 6 But as the files are being quietly examined by those
seeking not only evidence of crime, but also proof of deviance
from social or political norms, or information for private purposes either sinister or innocuous, we may well wonder who will
watch the watchers?
Patrick L. Moore

85. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a discussion of Olmstead see note 11
supra.
86. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 270.

